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CAPITAL GAINS JABBERWOCKY:
CAPITAL GAINS, INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY, AND TAX
Stephen T Black*
'It seems very pretty,' she said when she hadfinished it, 'but it's
rather hard to understand!' (You see she didn't like to confess, even to
herself,that she couldn't make it out at all.) 'Somehow it seems to fill my
head with ideas-only I don't exactly know what they are! However,
somebody killed something: that's clear, at any rate-"
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"[T]he difference between buying and selling as a business and
doing so as an investment avocation is ratherartificial. ,2
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the current U.S. tax system, gains derived from capital are taxed
preferentially when compared to other types of income. The history of
this split in analysis is long and marked by debate--debate whether there
is any justification for a preference, debate what that preference should
be, and debate as to whether the system is fair. This debate takes on
several forms and ranges from the academic to the practical, from the
metaphysical to the solid.
The earliest underpinnings of the debate can be found in some of
the earliest Supreme Court cases dealing with income. Following the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, which provided, "[t]he
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
2.

HAROLD M. GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 217 (1946); see

also Harold M. Groves in CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 17 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
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whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration, 3 the U.S.
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a stock
dividend was income.4
In answering in the negative, the Court gave its now famous
formulation of the concept of income: "'Income may be defined as the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided
it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets .... However, the Court went on:

The fundamental relation of "capital" to "income" has been much
discussed by economists, the former being likened to the tree or the
land, the latter to the fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a
reservoir supplied from springs, the latter as6 the outlet stream, to be
measured by its flow during a period of time.
As is evident from early cases, there was a clear sense that there
should be delineation between gains from labor and gains from capital,
even if the border between the two could not easily be found.
That sense was implicit in the Report of the House Committee on
Ways and Means, which recommended the enactment of the initial
capital gain provisions in 1921:
The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is now
seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series
of years are under the present law taxed as a lump sum ...in the year
in which the profit is realized. Many such sales, with their possible
profit taking and consequent increase of7 the tax revenue, have been
blocked by this feature of the present law.
According to one scholar, "[d]espite perennial re-examination of
the capital gains provisions, this elliptical' 8 utterance remains the
authoritative statement as to their justification.
In today's market, there is a continuing push, not exclusively from
tax counsel, to blur the lines between gain from labor and gain from
capital. It is based, in part, upon impetus from the intellectual property
movement to recognize and protect, as assets, business endeavors and
ideas. For example, business method patents did not come into vogue
3.

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.

4. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 199 (1920).
5. Id. at 207 (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)).
6. Id.at 206.
7. H.R. REP.No. 350, at 10-11 (1921).
8. Peter Miller, The "CapitalAsset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation: I, 59
YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 n.1 (1950).
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until the 1980s. 9 This resulted in the rather curious (and very interesting)
result that such assets (for example, the method of doing business) could
be sold, which in turn begs the question: What would be the character of
income realized from such a sale?
This Article will address anomalies in the characterization of such
intangible assets. Four cases will be presented, each of which arguably
could consistently produce capital gains. As will be shown, however, the
treatment of these cases (and others) is anything but consistent. At the
conclusion of the four cases, it should be clear that the inconsistency is
systemic, which in turn will lead us to ask whether: (1) none of these
intangible assets should receive capital gains treatment or (2) whether all
of them should.
II.

FOUR CASES IN SEARCH OF RECONCILIATION

A. Lawsuit Proceeds
1. Hypothetical

A paid P $10,000 for a judgment against D with a face amount of
$40,000. Two years later, D pays A $20,000 as a full settlement of the
judgment against him.
Would it matter if A sold the claim against D to B for $12,000?
2. Discussion
A lawsuit is a "chose in action," which Black's Law Dictionary
defines as "[t]he right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or
thing."10 Quoting William R. Anson, Black's Law Dictionarysets forth:
The term chose in action has been in common use for a long time, but
some doubts have been recently raised as to its precise meaning. A
Divisional Court, however, has now given us the following definition:
"'chose in action' is a known legal expression used to describe all
personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by
action, and not by taking physical possession." The phrase "rights of
property" does not seem a very happy one, but it is quite clear that the
court meant to include under the term chose in action rights under a
contract and rights of action arising from breach of contract.11

9. See Jonathon Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470,523 (2011).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (9th ed. 2009).
11. Id.(citations omitted) (quoting WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACT WITH A CHAPTER ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 362 n.b (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am.ed.
1919) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that a chose in action, "an
interest in property not immediately reducible to possession,"' 2 is
property, and the interest was transferable (more or less) at the time of
the founding of the nation.13
When a chose in action is settled, reduced to judgment, 14 or
assigned, a sale or exchange has occurred. 5 The characterization of
6 that
("IRC").1
Code
Revenue
Internal
the
of
1221
§
by
sale is governed
3. Capital vs. Ordinary Income in Related Cases
Chose in actions have been analyzed by the courts in several
contexts.
a. Interest Coupons
Interest coupons are a chose in action.
In Helvering v. Horst,'7 the facts were as follows:
[T]he owner of negotiable bonds, detached from them negotiable
interest coupons shortly before their due date and delivered them as a
gift to his son who in the same year collected them at maturity. The
Commissioner ruled that under the applicable § 22 of the Revenue Act
of 1934, the interest payments were taxable, in the years when paid,
to the respondent donor who reported his income on the cash
receipts basis.18
Note how the Court explained that the coupons were separate from

the bond itself:
The holder of a coupon bond is the owner of two independent and
separable kinds of right. One is the right to demand and receive at
maturity the principal amount of the bond representing capital
investment. The other is the right to demand and receive interim
payments of interest on the investment in the amounts and on the dates
specified by the coupons. Together they are an obligation to pay
principal and interest given in exchange for money or property which

12. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 275 (2008).
13. Id. at 275-85.
14. Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A
judgment is property, so taking it away requires due process of law.").
15. See Stephen T. Black, Katherine D. Black & Michael D. Black, A CapitalGainsAnomaly:
Commissioner v. Banks and the Proceeds From Lawsuits, 43 ST. MARY's L.J. 113, 169 (2011)
("Courts have long viewed the release by one party of another's legal obligations as a sale or
disposition of a property interest.").
16. See I.R.C. § 1221 (2006).
17. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
18. Id. at 114 (citation omitted).
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was presumably the consideration for the obligation of the bond. Here
respondent, as owner of the bonds, had acquired the legal right to
demand payment at maturity of the interest specified by the coupons
and the power to command its payment to others, which constituted an
economic gain to him. 19
b. Leases
In Helvering v. Bruun,20 a landlord regained possession of his land
when the tenant defaulted. 2' The tenant had built a building on the land,
and the landlord gained possession of the building, which was valued at
more than $51,000.22 The Court held that the value of the building
represented income to the landlord.23
In Hort v. Commissioner,24 a tenant decided to cancel a fifteen-year
lease on a building.25 The landlord and tenant agreed to a payment of
$140,000.26 The landlord had claimed a loss, representing the difference
between the present value of payments to be received under the lease and
the $140,000 (a smaller figure).27 The Court instead found that the entire
28
$140,000 represented income:
The consideration received for cancellation of the lease was not a
return of capital. We assume that the lease was 'property,' whatever
that signifies abstractly. Presumably the bond in Helvering v. Horst

and the lease in Helvering v. Bruun were also 'property,' but the
interest coupon in Horst and the building in Bruun nevertheless were
income.
held to constitute items of gross
Abstractly or not, the law treats dispositions of property as
income.3 ° In Horst, the issue before the Court was whether the father,
who had given the coupons to his son, recognized income. 31 The Court
held he did since he disposed of the right to the interest income.32 This is
both an issue of realization (when was it income?) and of shifting
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 115.
309 U.S. 461 (1940).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 464-65.
Id. at 469.
313 U.S. 28 (1941).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006).
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940).
Id. at 120.
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(whose income was it?). However, there was no doubt that the coupons
were property.33
In Bruun, the taxpayer ended up with an additional building.3 4 The
building itself was not income, but the transfer (voluntary or not) of it to
the landlord resulted in income to the landlord. 35 Further, according to
the Court in Hort:
Simply because the lease was 'property' the amount received for its
cancellation was not a return of capital, quite apart from the fact that
'property' and 'capital' are not necessarily synonymous in the Revenue
Act of 1932 or in common usage. Where, as in this case, the disputed
amount was essentially a substitute for rental payments which § 22 (a)
[of the Act] expressly characterizes as gross income, it must be
regarded as ordinary income, and it is immaterial that for some
purposes the contract creating 36the right to such payments may be
treated as 'property' or 'capital.'
Rents were 37 (and are)3 8 included in gross income. However, the
transfer of a lease is not obviously a "substitute for rental payments.
Consider the following: L, a landlord, leases real property to T for fifteen
years. Six years into the lease, L sells the property to B for $100.
L's receipt of $100 obviously includes B's appraisal of the relative
value of having a tenant occupy the property, but it is not obvious that L
must separately value the land and the occupying leasehold. Nor is it
obvious that L recognizes ordinary income from the portion of the $100
attributable to the lease.
We would characterize L's gain by application of IRC § 1221.
Since the property is being rented, it falls under the definition of "real
property used in his trade or business. 4 ° Our attention then turns to
§§ 1231 and 1250. To the extent L's gain is not due to "additional
depreciation,' 4 1 it becomes a "§ 1231 gain ' 42 and is characterized by the
§ 1231 hotchpot.43 If L has no other § 1231 gains or losses, the gain
would be capital. 44
33. See id. at 114.
34. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461,469 (1940).
35.
36.

See id.
Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941).

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 30.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2006).
SeeHort, 313 U.S. at 31.

40.

I.R.C. § 1221.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. §
Id. §
Id.§
Id. §

1250(b)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1231(a)(3)(A).
1231(a)(3).
1231(a)(3)(A).
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But now suppose that L assigns the lease to C. The assigned lease is
property. Should the gain L realizes be characterized any differently?
The Court in Hort noted:
For the same reasons, that amount was not a return of capital
because petitioner acquired the lease as an incident of the realty
devised to him by his father. Theoretically, it might have been possible
in such a case to value realty and lease separately and to label each a
capital asset. But that would not have converted into capital the amount
petitioner received from the Trust Co., since § 22 (b) (3) of the 1932
Act would have required him to include in gross income the rent
derived from the property, and that section, like § 22 (a), does not
distinguish rental pa ,'ments and a payment which is clearly a substitute
for rental payments.
Why is the gain "clearly" a substitute for rental payments?
Section 1221 does not make it so, nor does § 1231.46
We find some support for a similar, although not exact, argument
that would treat the sale as ordinary income because it represented
"deemed anticipated rent.' '47 For example, if L leases land to T, and T
prepays the rent, L should have ordinary income. Similarly, if L were to
"assign" to T the remainder of his lease (a property interest), L should
still have ordinary income. The Supreme Court has held that:
The purpose of § 117 was "to relieve the taxpayer
from... excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of
capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens
on such conversions." And this exception has always been narrowly
construed so as to protect the revenue against artful devices.
We do not see here any conversion of a capital investment. The
lump sum consideration seems essentially a substitute for4 what would
otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income. 8
But are those exceptions the same as saying that every transaction
involving a lease (for example, its sale, transfer, or cancellation) results
in ordinary income? Consider that thirty years later, the Court came back
with this:
In essence, petitioner argues that "property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business)" does not include
property that is acquired and held for a business purpose. In
45.
46.
47.
48.
omitted).

Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
SeeI.R.C. §§ 1221,1231.
I.R.S. Gen. Cours.Mem. 33,793 (Apr. 11, 1968).
Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) (alteration in original) (citations
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petitioner's view an asset's status as "property" thus turns on the
motivation behind its acquisition. This motive test, however, is not
only nowhere mentioned in § 1221, but it is also in direct conflict with
the parenthetical phrase "whether or not connected with his trade or
business." The broad definition of the term "capital asset" explicitly
makes irrelevant any consideration of the property's connection with
the taxpayer's business,
whereas petitioner's rule would make this
49
dispositive.
factor
It should also be noted that in 1954, Congress clarified that
"[a]mounts received by a lessee for the cancellation of a lease, or by a
distributor of goods for the cancellation of a distributor's agreement...,
shall be considered as amounts received in exchange for such lease or
agreement." 50 This effectively overrules any of the cases discussing lease
or contract cancellation prior to 1954, even though many of them
continue to be relied upon, directly or indirectly.5 1
Having seen what the law does with bonds and leases, what are we
to learn about choses in action?
4. Lawsuit Cases
In Hudson v. Commissioner,52 a businessman and an attorney
bought a judgment for $11,004.00 that had a face amount of $75,702.12
paid them $21,150 as a full
in the year 1943. 53 In 1945, the defendant
54
settlement of the judgment against him.
Each of the two reported his profit on the settlement of the
judgment as a long-term capital gain for 1945. 55 Judge Johnson of the
Tax Court said:
There is no question about the bona fides of the transaction, nor is there
any disagreement about the fact that the judgment, when entered and
transferred, was property and a capital asset. The parties differ,
question of whether there was a "sale or exchange of a
however, on the
56
capital asset."

49.
50.
51.
(1941)).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Ark. Best Corp. v. Comn'r, 485 U.S. 212, 217 (1988) (emphasis added).
I.R.C. § 1241.
See, e.g., Ark. Best Corp., 483 U.S. at 217 n.5 (citing Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28
20 T.C. 734 (1953).
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 736.
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He was presumably troubled by the requirement in the IRC that
there be a sale or exchange, and that it appeared to the court that the
57
property was extinguished following the transaction:
We cannot see how there was a transfer of property, or how the
judgment debtor acquired property as the result of the transaction
wherein the judgment was settled. The most that can be said is that the
judgment debtor paid a debt or extinguished a claim so as to preclude
execution on the judgment outstanding against him. In a hypothetical
case, if the judgment had been transferred to someone other than the
judgment debtor, the property transferred would still be in existence
after the transaction was completed. However, as it actually happened,
when the judgment debtor settled the judgment, the claim arising from
the judgment was extinguished without the transfer of any property or
property right to the judgment debtor. In their day-to-day transactions,
neither businessmen nor lawyers would call the settlement of a
judgment a sale; we can see no reason to apply a strained interpretation
to the transaction before us. When petitioners received the $21,150 in
full settlement of the judgment, they did not recover the money as the
result of any sale or exchange but only as a collection or settlement of
58
the judgment.
a. Extinguished Property
The court made a point of the fact that after the transaction, the
debtor appeared to receive no property.5 9 Other courts have faced
difficulty with this concept.
For example, in Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc.,60 the Second
Circuit said:
Undoubtedly the taxpayer's rights under the 1903 contract were
property; and we will assume arguendo, as does the Commissioner,
that they were a capital asset. The decisive issue is whether there was a
"sale or exchange" of such capital asset when the contract was
terminated in 1943. To refer to the contract as a grant of a "franchise"
tends, we think, to becloud analysis of the legal relations. What the
taxpayer gave in return for the cash payment was a release of United's
contract obligations, chief of which was its promise not to sell its
products to other dealers in New London. Such release not only ended

57.
58.
59.
60.

See id.
Id.
Id.
204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
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the promisor's previously existing duty but also destroyed the
promisee's rights. They were not transferred
to the promisor; they
61
merely came to an end and vanished.
Strange how the court could use language such as "what the
taxpayer gave in returnfor the cash payment" and yet not recognize that
as an exchange. We may chalk that up to legal trends in the 1940s and
1950s, since they did not treat nearly as many things as assets as we
do today.
Still, it does not necessarily follow that everything that is
exchanged for cash or property is necessarily property itself. A contract
for services, for example, may be consummated by a transfer of cash or
property, but that does not necessarily mean that we think the services
are property, does it?
Whatever may have been the case in 1953-and this is not really
the case because most of my examples will have been in existence back
then-there are many examples of property that extinguishes itself.
For example, for many years prior to 1954, courts struggled with
the issue of what happens when a lease is cancelled, either by a payment
by the tenant (for example, the landlord's income) or by the landlord (the
tenant's income).62 In 1954, Congress responded to the tenant's income
issue by enacting § 1241.63 Pursuant to § 1241, "amounts received by a
lessee (not by the lessor) for the cancellation of a lease, or by a
distributor (not by the supplier) for the cancellation of a distributor's
agreement, if there is a substantial capital investment, are treated as
received in a capital transaction., 64 In fact, the Second Circuit held:
The Commissioner attacks the Golonsky decision on the ground
that it is inconsistent with recent decisions of this court holding
payments made for the release of contractual rights, such as the right to
an exclusive agency, to be ordinary income. In these cases no "sale or
exchange" within the meaning of the statute was found because the
contractual right was not transferred, but was released and merely
vanished. However, we think the right of possession under a lease or
61. Id. at 674 (emphasis added); see also Bingham v. Comm'r, 105 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir.
1939) ("What may have been property in the hands of the holder of the notes simply vanished when
the surrender took place and the maker received them.").
62. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1952); United Cigar-Whelan
Stores Corp. v. District of Columbia, 176 F.2d 952, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Borland v. Comm'r, 27
B.T.A. 538, 542 (1933); Bus. Real Estate Trust of Bos. v. Comm'r, 25 B.T.A. 191, 193 (1932);
Bretzfelder v. Comm'r, 21 B.T.A. 789, 789 (1930); Miller v. Comm'r, 10 B.T.A. 383, 383 (1928).
63. See I.R.C. § 1241 (2006).
64. Brady 0. Bryson, The 1954 Internal Revenue Code: Gains and Losses on Sales and
Exchanges,42 A.B.A. J. 628, 632 (1956); see also Comn'r v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210
F.2d 752, 753 (2d Cir. 1954); cf StarrBros., Inc., 204 F.2d at 674.
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otherwise, is a more substantial property right which does not lose its
existence when it is transferred. If it is sold by the tenant to a third
person, the gain derived therefrom is a capital gain, and we see no
reason why a different result should be reached here. Moreover, the
transaction seems closer to those cases holding that gain derived by the
holder of a life interest upon sale to the remainderman is to be taxed as
a capital gain. The decision of the Supreme Court in Hort v.
Commissioner does not require a different result. There, in holding a
payment made by the lessee to the landlord to cancel the lease to be
ordinary income, reliance was placed on the fact that the payment took
the place of what ordinarily
would be payments for rent. That argument
6
cannot be advanced here. Y
The issue for the landlord may involve three types of transfers: (1)
payments to cancel a lease; (2) payments to restore the premise to its
former condition; and (3) buildings or improvements built or made by
the tenant and subsequently left on the premises.
The first category of transfers-those from the tenant to the
landlord to cancel a lease-was the subject of the Hort case, 66 even
though the Court recognized that "[t]heoretically, it might have been
possible in such a case to value realty and lease separately and to label
67
each a capital asset.,
The second category of transfers-payments to restore the
premises-are taxed as a recovery of basis first, then as capital gains.68
The third category is excludable pursuant to IRC § 109.69
The relevant question after examining the difference in treatment is:
To what extent can this be manipulated by the taxpayer? How hard is it
to categorize these three types of payments?
Finally, consider the example of a university professor's tenure:
The right of tenure is granted at the end of the probationary period, in
which the professor is an at will employee. This probationary period is
most analogous to a term-of-years contract, which upon expiration stirs
evaluation for tenured employment. This analogy is valid because the
end of the probationary period inevitably marks a fundamental change
in the employer-employee relationship. If the professor receives a
negative evaluation, then the employment relationship simply ends. If
the professor receives a positive evaluation, then the university offers
65. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d at 753 (citations omitted).
66. Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28, 28-29 (1941).
67. Id.at 31.
68. See Bos. Fish Mkt. Corp. v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 884, 889-90 (1972); cf Sirbo Holdings, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 509 F.2d 1220, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1975).
69. See I.R.C. § 109 (2006); see also H. REP. No. 2333, at 69 (1942); S.REP. No.1631, at 7879 (1942).
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the professor a tenured position, which the professor is free to either
accept or reject. In this sense, the end of the probationary period marks
the beginning of negotiations between the university and the professor
for further employment. The agreement struck between the university
and the professor is more than just a promotion; it is the beginning of a
new employer-employee relationship with newly negotiated rights. ....
Another distinction is that the purchase of tenure rights does not
really give any property right back to the university. This so-called
"disappearing asset" theory arose in a series of cases from the 1950s,
generally stating that no property interest is vested in the purchaser, but
for the extinguishing of the right held by the seller. This distinction is
also doubtful, as the sale of such tenure rights endows the university
with the right to permanently terminate the employment relationship,
which is something that it did not possess prior to the transaction.
Therefore, as the right shifts from employee
to employer, it does not
70
disappear, but merely changes in format.
The IRS has dealt with the "disappearing asset" theory before, in
circumstances where it is hard to justify not classifying the transaction as
one involving property. 7' This occurs in transactions somewhere
between the Supreme Court stating that it is:
evident that not everything which can be called property in the
ordinary sense and which is outside the statutory exclusions [of
§ 1221] qualifies as a capital asset. [The term] "capital asset" is to be
construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to
afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the
realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of
time .. 72
or "[t]he lump sum consideration seems essentially a substitute for what
would otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income ....
In
short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not
for an increase in the value of the income-producing property, 73 and
contrary cases which have held, "[s]imply because the property

70. Christopher Meskill, The Tenure Tax: Social Security Withholdings on Academic
Retirement After University of Pittsburgh v. United States, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 937, 966-67
(2011) (footnotes omitted).
71. I.R.S. Field Serv. Advice 20023805, at 15 (Aug. 16, 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200215037, at 90-91 (Jan. 14, 2002).
72. Comm'r v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 130, 134, 136 (1960) (explaining
that compensation for temporary seizure of business facilities is ordinary income).
73. Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 264-66 (1958) (denying capital gain treatment
on the disposition of certain mineral payments carved out of established oil and gas working
interests).
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transferred will produce ordinary income, and such income is a major
factor in determining the value of the property, does not necessarily
mean that the amount received for
the property is essentially a lump-sum
74
income.,
ordinary
for
substitute
In these types of situations, the theory (which the IRS has advanced
to a doctrine) is helpful in making believe that the tax system is rational.
Otherwise, these edge cases might show that contracts can be converted
into property (sometimes multiple times for the same "property"), and
this property (or some portion of it) can be transferred for what appears
to be capital gain.
Contracts are not the only types of property suffering in this nomans-land of taxation. Other types of property that may become
extinguished are tickets (extinguished when used, upon passage of time,
or when refunded), licenses, stock, or nearly any other type of intangible
property. That does not mean that if they were to be sold, bartered, or
exchanged, that there was not a transfer of property.
Indeed, the example of a chose in action is interesting. If A has a
claim against B, the law says A has property. A may, among other things,
transfer, assign, ignore, or prosecute his rights. If transferred to a third
party, C, C has those same rights. Should the statute of limitations run,
A's (or C's) rights will extinguish. But A (or C) still owned property.
Indeed, we could imagine an example where A's claim is subject to
a statute of limitation, which has run, but the legislature subsequently
extends the time.75 Assume that A's claim expires on December 31,
Year 1. Further assume that the legislature takes action on December 31,
Year 2, giving A until December 31, Year 3 to file her action.
During Year 1, A owns a property right. During Year 2, we are not
quite sure, but during Year 3, A again owns a property right.
It seems clear that during Years 1 and 3, should A transfer her right
to another, there would have been a sale or exchange. What about a
transfer during Year 2?
There are a number of other examples, including the transfer of
restricted stock,76 the transfer of "extinguished" property which has now
74. Guggenheim v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 559, 565, 569 (1966) (involving the sale of syndicated
interests in a racehorse); see also United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 57, 59 (5th Cir.
1963) (involving transfer of an "exclusive" feature of a patent contract); Comm'r v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d
125, 126, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1962) (involving various rights in a literary work); Estate of Shea v.
Comm'r, 57 T.C. 15, 25 (1971) (involving a shipping charter).
75. "[l]t cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy
lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment." Chase Sec.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945).
76. Coordinated Issue: All Industries: Transfer or Sale of Compensatory Options or
Restricted Stock To Related Persons: UIL: 9300.28-00, IRS, 9-10 (Oct. 15, 2004),
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become a collector's item, 77 the transfer of caught baseballs, 78 the
transfer of a right to rescind that expires after X years,79 the transfer of a
copyright or patent, 80 or the transfer of Baltimore ground rents, 8' just to
name a few.82 Are we prepared to assert that these properties cease to be
property for tax purposes
when their existence is extinguished (or may
83
be extinguished)?
Looking at the issue from B's point of view, B may feel a risk of
loss. That feeling will go away upon the running of the statute of
limitations or upon a release of claims. Is B's possession of A's release
of claims, whether by implicit or explicit agreement with the possessor
of the chose or whether by judicial fiat, considered property?
In this case, B's property (the release of claims) is really not
transferable,84 but it represents an asset to B. It is a bundle of rights, not
the least among which is the assurance that A (or her assigns) will not
prosecute rights against B. It can be analogized to a covenant not to
compete or any other contract prescribing action on the part of the
maker. The holder of such a contract holds property, but may he sell or
exchange it for tax purposes?
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/compensatoryfinal.pdf; see also Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v.
Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 390 (Del. 2010).
77. For example, gambling chips from defunct casinos.
78. Does the value of this expire upon our forgetting to remember who the player was? See
Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Dominion and Control:
Applying the "Claim of Right Doctrine" to Found Objects, Including Record-Setting Baseballs, 4
FLA. TAX REV. 685, 724-25 (2000); Lawrence A. Zelenak and Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing
Baseballs and Other Found Property, 84 TAx NOTES 1299, 1307-08 (1999).
79. See Elwin Griffith, The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Confronting the Challenges in
the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 345, 370-71 (2003).
80. See Valmet Paper Mach., Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (W.D. Wis. 1994)
(holding that one may transfer the right to sue for past infringements of a now-expired patent).
However, certain agreements with businesses in China, including those containing payments for
expired patents, cannot be registered. David Williams Russell, Technology Transfers from the
United States to the People's Republic of China, 3 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 81, 87 (2004).
81. Muskin v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 30 A.3d 962, 965 (Md. 2011); Frank
A. Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 MD. L. REV. 1, 25-26
(1940).
82. Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A Biological and
CulturalAnalysis, 1 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 20, 26 n.25 (1998).
83. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1011-12 (1992) (permitting review of
takings claim where statute extinguished property's value). See also the discussion of Nahey v.
Commissioner,which noted:
It shouldn't make a difference that Wisconsin law (the goveming law in the Xerox case)
cut off Nahey's right to recover for Wehr's lost profits as of the date of the sale of the
corporation to him, while in the case of the bond the interest is received after the
acquisition.
Nahey v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the court still held that the "asset"
continued to yield income. Id. at 869.
84. Or is it?
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b. Third-Party Transfer
If putative property is property when sold, exchanged, or
transferred to a third party, it should be treated as property for all intents
and purposes. For example, if A owns something and it is transferred to
B, the something is property (and remains property in B's hands), then it
stands to reason that if A were to transfer the something to C, it should
be treated as property.
In Hudson, when the parties settled the lawsuit for cash, the
settlement was a transfer of property.85 Had they transferred it to a third
party for cash (instead of settling), the court would have been prepared
to call that a property transfer. 6 Instead, they transferred their rights to
the defendant.8 7
Perhaps the qualm with this analysis lies in the fact that we are
using the term "transferred." We speak of transfers of cash (although in
today's market, many of those "transfers" are fictional, "electronic"
accounting entries), transfers of stock (again, accounting entries-not
many individuals ever see the stock certificates they purport to "own"),
transfers of land (livery of seizin has not been performed in a while),
and so forth.
In fact, many of our modem day transfers involve electronic or
paper evidences of ownership-proof, if you will, that our possession or
control of "property" is rightful. Part of the mortgage crisis involves the
question of proof of ownership, not actual possession.88
When we speak of a transfer of intangible property-a copyright,
knowhow, a release of a lawsuit-we are talking about an exchange of
rights for something else. While that exchange, especially when
intangible property is involved, may be embodied in a contract, it is not
the contract that is being transferred. The exchange may involve a
forbearance of services, but the nature of the exchange is that rights,
which were possessed by the plaintiff, have been transferred to the
defendant, who now owns them as assurance that the plaintiff will no
longer enforce or pursue them.

85. Hudson v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 734, 735-36 (1953).
86. Id. at 736.
87. Id.
88. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, A Free House, and Other N.Y ForeclosureTales, WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 2010, at A1.
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c. A Rose by Any Other Name: Sale or Exchange.
In Hudson, the court argued that businessmen would not term the
settlement of a lawsuit a sale.89 While this may be true, we do not rely
upon the parties' language to determine federal tax consequences.9" The
economic substance of this exchange is this: One party owned a chose in
action, which the law treats as property. That party transferred those
rights for cash. The appropriate treatment is to treat the exchange as a
"sale or exchange." 91
5. Origin of the Claim
In looking for a clear path, 92 we might be tempted to follow some
courts that latch on to the origin of the claim test. 93 In doing so, however,
we will eventually come to chase our own tails. Consider, for example,
the conundrum the Seventh Circuit found itself in when deciding Nahey
v. Commissioner.94 Nahey (actually, his S corporations) had purchased a
corporation that had a pending suit against Xerox.95 Six years later,
Xerox settled the suit for $6 million.96
Nahey conceded that if the original corporation had collected from
Xerox, the $6 million would be ordinary income.9 7 His claim, however,
was that since the chose in action in his hands was a capital asset-the
claim the court bought-the gain from the disposition of that asset
should also be capital-which the court disagreed with.98
Strangely enough, the Nahey court relied upon Alexander v.
Commissioner,99 which in turn relied upon the 1943 Third Circuit

89. Hudson, 20 T.C. at 736.
90. "In cases where the legal characterization of economic facts is decisive, the principle is
well established that the tax consequences should be determined by the economic substance of the
transaction, not the labels put on it for property law (or tax avoidance) purposes." Union Planters
Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1970).
91. See I.R.C. § 1222 (2006).
92. Alice and the Cheshire Cat's conversation is instructive:
Alice: Oh, no, no. I was just wondering ifyou could help me find my way.
Cheshire Cat: Well that depends on where you want to get to.
Alice: Oh, it really doesn't matter, as long as...
Cheshire Cat: Then it really doesn't matter which way you go.
ALICE INWONDERLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1951).
93. Katherine D. Black, Michael D. Black & Stephen T. Black, Taxation of Contingency
Fees: Deductionsfor Expenses?, TAX NOTES: TAx PRAC., Feb. 8, 2010, at 1-2.
94. 196 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1999).
95. Id at 867.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 868.
99. Nahey, 196 F.3d at 867-68; 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
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decision, Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner.0 0 There, the Third Circuit
explained, "[w]e have no doubt that the payment here of the claim held
by the estate was a 'disposition' of the claim within the meaning of [the
predecessor of § 1001]."' °0l The Alexander court, however, decided that
settling a lawsuit was unlike settling a debt (presumably because a debt
is more marketable?), and therefore the suit would
generate ordinary
02
income because it had not been sold or disposed of.1

Alexander further decided that the test in Raytheon Production
Corp. v. Commissioner'0 3 should be dispositive. 1°4 Raytheon involved
10 5
the recovery by one corporation against another in an antitrust suit.

The court actually held two things. First:
Damages recovered in an antitrust action are not necessarily
nontaxable as a return of capital. As in other types of tort damage suits,
recoveries which represent a reimbursement for lost profits are
income.... The reasoning is that since the profits would be taxable

income, the proceeds of litigation which are their substitute are taxable
in like manner. 106

This has been formulated using the court's own language: "[T]he
question to 7 be asked is '[i]n lieu of what were the damages
awarded?'

10

However, the court continued:
Where the suit is not to recover lost profits but is for injury to good
will, the recovery represents a return of capital and, with certain
limitations to be set forth below, is not taxable. "Care must certainly be
taken in such cases10 to
avoid taxing recoveries for injuries to good will
8
or loss of capital."'
Finally, the court concluded:
Upon examination of Raytheon's declaration in its anti-trust suit we
find nothing to indicate that the suit was for the recovery of lost profits.
The allegations were that the illegal conduct of R.C.A. "completely
destroyed the profitable interstate and foreign commerce of the
plaintiff and thereby, by the early part of 1928, the said tube business
of the plaintiff and the property good will of the plaintiff therein had
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Alexander, 72 F.3d at 943; 139 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1943).
Herbert'sEstate, 139 F.2d at 758.
See Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942-44.
144 F.2d l10(1st Cir. 1944).
Alexander, 72 F.3d at 942.
Raytheon, 144 F.2dat 112-13.
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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been totally destroyed at a time when it then had a present value in
excess of three million dollars and thereby the plaintiff was then
injured in its business and property in a sum in excess of three million
dollars." This was not the sort of antitrust suit where the plaintiff's
business still exists and where the injury was merely for loss of profits.
The allegations and evidence as to the amount of profits were
necessary in order to establish the value of the good will and business
since that is derived by a capitalization of profits. A somewhat similar
idea was expressed in Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner.
"Profits were one of the chief indications of the worth of the business;
but the usual earnings before the injury, as compared with those
afterward, were only an evidential factor in determining actual loss and
not an independent basis for recovery." Since the suit was to recover
damages for the destruction of the business and good will, the recovery
represents a return of capital. Nor does the fact that the suit ended in a
compromise settlement change the nature of the recovery; "the
determining factor is the nature of109the basis claim from which the
compromised amount was realized."
That brings us back to Nahey, which decided that Raytheon's
analysis was too broad.110 In fact, the Nahey court stated, "we add that
we cannot find any practical reason for why the tax treatment of the
proceeds of a suit should change merely because of an intervening
change in ownership." 1 ' The court dismissed Nahey's claim that
1 12the
"nature and basis of' Nahey's claim was the purchase of a business.
Which in turn leaves us with a slightly sour aftertaste. Why? It
seems that Nahey and Alexander cite to Raytheon and Hebert,1 13 but
miss the fact that those two suits support the claim that dispositions of
claims may be capital in nature. Lawsuits are, in the words of the
'
Under
Supreme Court, "property"'1 14 and "income producing assets."115

109. Id. at 113-14 (citation omitted).
110. See Nahey v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 866, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1999).
111. Id.at 869.
112. Id.at 867-69.
113. See supranotes 100-12 and accompanying text.
114. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) ("[A] chose in action is a
");see also Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341
constitutionally recognized property interest ....
U.S. 428, 439 (1951). Further:
[ln 1816, Justice Story, writing for a unanimous Court, summarized the practice in
American courts as follows: "Courts of law, following in this respect the rules of equity,
now take notice of assignments of choses in action, and exert themselves to afford them
every support and protection." He added that courts of equity have "disregarded the rigid
strictness of the common law, and protected the rights of the assignee of choses in
action," and noted that courts of common law "now consider an assignment of a chose in
action as substantially valid, only preserving, in certain cases, the form of an action
commenced in the name of the assignor."
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the relevant tax statutes, the sale or exchange of those assets should
produce capital gains. However, a minefield of subsequent, wellmeaning but well-confused cases have left a group of judicial doctrines
with no firm underpinnings except a vague notion that there is a potential
to convert the income from those "assets" into capital gains and a sense
that that result is undesirable.
B. Sale of Copyright andSale ofPatent
1. Hypothetical
A creates an invention and applies for and is granted a patent for the
invention. He sells the patent to C for $10,000. The $10,000 (less A's
costs) is treated as long-term capital gain.
B writes a novel, which is protected under U.S. copyright law. She
sells the rights to her book to D for $10,000. B's $10,000 (less some
costs) is treated as ordinary income.
2. History
In 1950, Congress amended IRC § 117:
The bill as passed by the House amended section 117 (a) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code so as to exclude copyrights, patents, inventions,
designs, and literary, musical, or artistic compositions, and similar
property from the definition of "capital assets" when held by certain
taxpayers. Amendments Nos. 77 and 78 remove patents, inventions,
and designs from this exclusion. 116
The Senate Report of the bill stated:
When a person is in the profession of writing books, or creating
other artistic works, his income from the sale of the products of his
work is taxed as ordinary income. This is true whether he receives
royalties from the use of his products or sells them outright, since the
products of his work are held by him "primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business" and are, therefore, not
treated as capital assets.
If an amateur receives royalties on his book or other artistic work,
they are treated as ordinary income, but if he holds his book or other
It bears noting, however, that at the time of the founding (and in some States well
before then) the law did permit the assignment of legal title to at least some choses in
action. In such cases, the assignee could bring suit on the assigned claim in his own
name, in a court of law.
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Sen's., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 278-79 (2008) (citations omitted).
115. Comm'rv. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 435 (2005).
116. H.R. REP. No. 81-3124, at 27 (1950) (Conf. Rep.).
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artistic work for 6 months (3 months under this bill) and then sells it
outright he can avail himself of a loophole which treats such a sale as
the sale of a capital asset, not held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business. As a result the
taxpayer receives long-term capital gain treatment on the product of his
personal effort.
It is estimated that this amendment may yield nearly $1 million
annually in additional revenue.
The House bill also would have treated as ordinary income gains
from the sale of an invention or patent by the occasional inventor. Your
committee believes that the desirability of fostering the work of such
inventors outweighs the small amount of additional revenue which
might be obtained under the House bill, and therefore the words
and "design" have been eliminated from this
"invention," "patent,"
117
bill.
the
of
section
Beginning in 1950, copyrights were excluded from the definition of
capital asset. This meant that, while an asset, a copyright that was sold
would generate ordinary income (as would any property that was being
held for sale to customers).
Patents, however, were accorded different status, due in part to the
Cold War then in process. It was felt that encouraging scientists via a tax
118
break (ordinary income rates were as high as 88% in the 1950s)
would benefit the national interest. In fact, one historian has credited,
in capital gains tax rates for the success of
in part, the differential
9
Valley."l
Silicon
Patents were not within the exclusion from capital gains and thus
were still considered to be capital assets, at least as long as they did not
meet any of the other exclusionary tests.120 One of the biggest exclusions
was for assets held for sale to customers in the regular course of the
taxpayer's business. 121 This test led to the common understanding that
professional inventors' patents were not capital assets (and the sale of
117. S.REP. No. 81-2375, at 43-44 (1950).
118. US. Individual Income Tax: PersonalExemptions and Lowest and Highest Tax Bracket
Tax Rates and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years 1913-2013, TAX POLICY CTR.(Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/historicalparameters.pdf.
119. Paul Kedrosky, Conversation With Steve Blank, Serial Entrepreneur, Professor and
Author, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION (Sept. 21, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.kauffman.org/
InfectiousTalk/Blog/September,-2010/Conversation-with-Steve-Blank,-serial-entrepreneuraspx
Mr. Blank does get the tax facts wrong, however, since the capital gains rate differential was much
greater during the 1950s and 60s than it was in the 70s. See Top FederalIncome Tax Since 1913,
CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE (Nov. 2011), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf.
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. See I.R.C. § 122 1(a)(8) (2006).
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which would generate ordinary income), while amateur inventors'
122
patents would generate capital gains.
This situation only lasted a few years before Congress decided to
put an end to the confusion and legal wrangling, and enacted § 1235:
Under existing law, only amateur as distinct from professional
inventors can obtain capital gain treatment; and, to make this
distinction, it has become necessary to determine whether sufficient
prior inventions exist to warrant placing the taxpayer in the business of
selling inventions to customers, a requirement that has in many
instances caused confusion and litigation. To obviate this difficulty in
the case of gain, and to provide a larger incentive to all inventors to
contribute to the welfare of the nation, this section is applicable equally
to all inventors, whether amateur or professional, regardless how often
they sell their [inventions]. 123
So if a professional inventor with 100 patents sells her newest
patent, she is treated to capital gains rates, while the amateur or
24
professional author is relegated to ordinary income. 1
3. What Is a Copyright?
What types of rights does it involve? Do they all derive from my
labor? Or are some derived from the capital that my labor produces?
Once I have created the story, is some of the copyright gain due to that
capital asset (and not my labor)?
It is important to distinguish between the physical work and the
underlying copyright in the work. For example, in the case of an artist,
the community [(the artist and his/her spouse)] will be entitled to the
market value of any unsold paintings in a divorce but if the painter is
famous there may be value to the other reproduction and
merchandising rights in the paintings. 125
This could mean, for example, that an unsold painting is worth
$1000, but if retained by the painter, there may be additional value in
reproduction and merchandising rights (for example, rights to make
copies and derivatives of the painting). If sold for $200, would the gain
122. H.R REP. NO. 83-1337, at A280 (1954).
123. Id.
124. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property
Taxation: Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795,
833-34 (2011). However, the musician may be able to elect capital gains treatment pursuant to
§ 1221(b)(3). Id at 834-35.
125. A Writer's Guide: Copyright, Divorce Community Property in California, L.A. DIVORCE
& FAM. L. (Jan. 6, 2009, 4:33 PM), http://lafamilylaw.typepad.com/lafanilylaw/2009/01/a-writersguide-copyright-divorce-community-property-in-califomia.htm [hereinafter A Writer's Guide].
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from those additional rights be attributable to the painter's labor in
creating the retained painting? Would it be due to the painter's
reputation? Would it be due to the painter's agent's work?
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Siegel v. United States, 126 "the line
between earned income and income from property is not always marked
with dazzling clarity., 127 In such a case, the copyright would be treated
as property, and the amounts received by the son upon the sale of the
story to a publisher would constitute income to the son and not to the
example differ from the situation presented in
author.128 How does this
129
Helvering v. Eubank?
If this is the first time the painter has sold merchandising rights, are
they considered property "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business"? 13 °
The DROID line of phones is developed by Motorola, who licenses
the trademark "DROID" from Lucasfilm LTD. 3 ' From 1973 to 1974,
George Lucas began writing the screenplay for Star Wars. 132 The
screenplay was turned down by several studios until he was able to strike
a deal with Twentieth Century Fox. 133 Lucas agreed to forgo his salary in
exchange for forty percent of the film's box office take and all
merchandising rights. 134 Are the trademark rights still attributable
directly to Lucas's personal efforts in creating the screenplay?
Consider the case of Jerry Lewis and Patti Lewis who divorced after 35
years. In the divorce, Patti reached a settlement under which she was
entitled to a one half interest in royalties from "Community Titles"
over which Jerry retained control. This included the Nutty Professor
which was remade by Universal with Eddie Murphy. In a subsequent
lawsuit, Patti alleged that Jerry structured the deal with Universal i[n]
such a way that minimized the "remake rights" (to which she was
entitled to 50%) but paid him substantial personal service fees as writer
and producer (which did not). 135

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

464 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 894.
See Rev. Rul. 54-599, 1954-1 C.B. 52.
311 U.S. 149 (1940).
I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2006).
See George Lucas Owns the Droid: The Name, Not the Phone, GEEKSUGAR (Nov. 6,

2009, 3:50 AM), http://www.geeksugar.com/George-Lucas-Owns-Term-DROID-Motorola-PaysFee-License-6051336.
132. Biography for George Lucas, INTERNET MOvIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0000184/bio (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. A Writer's Guide, supra note 125.
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Could Jerry have structured the deal the opposite way-maximizing
the remake rights and minimizing the personal service fees? If so, then
the gain from the deal would be due not to Jerry's "services," but rather
to the property. And are we taxing him on labor he performed some
decades earlier? That was exactly what one of the arguments was in
favor of lower capital gains rates-to tax gains that matured over many
years at a lower rate to avoid the bunching problem.
4. Fruit of Tree vs. Creating the Tree
In the 1950s, Congress considered that the relative tax loss from
leaving patents in § 1221 (for example, the loss in revenue in treating
gain from a sale of a patent as capital gains instead of ordinary income)
would be minor. 136 Some analysts have estimated that U.S. patents may
account for in excess of $9 trillion dollars in value 137 and that royalties
paid may total in excess of $36.5 billion.138
Congress also considered that gains from the sales of intellectual
property assets were really due to the labor of the creators and thus
properly taxable as ordinary income. 139 However, Congress has
significantly eroded the justification by removing patents from the
exception and then recently treating some copyrights as capital gains
1 40
while leaving others taxed at ordinary income rates.
This makes less sense when we consider the current landscape of
copyright transfers. The copyright property itself may be divided up in
so many ways and over so long a period of time 14 1 that it is no longer
simple to say that copyright gains are due to the personal labor of
the author.

136. S.REP.No. 81-2375, at44(1950).
137. See Intangible Asset Market Value, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/
productsandservices/investments/intangible-market-value (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (stating that
eighty percent of the S&P 500 market value consists of intangible assets, a significant
portion of which is represented by patented technology); S&P 500, STANDARD & POOR'S
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexld=spusa-500-usduf-p-us-i-- (estimating the value of the S&P 500).
138. Royalty and License Fees, Payments (BoP, Current US$), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
139. S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 43-44 (1950).
140. See supra Part ll.B.2.
141. For copyrights in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, copyright protection
"endures for.., the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(2006).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss2/5

24

Black: Capital Gains Jabberwocky: Capital Gain, Intangible Property, and

2012]

CAPITAL GAINS, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY, AND TAX

C. Whistleblower Awards
1. Hypothetical
Employee copies the past three years' worth of financial data from
her Employer's computer system to a thumb drive. She then gives the
thumb drive to the IRS. The IRS, some years later, pays Employee
$50,000, because they used the information to collect taxes from
Employer.
2. New Whistleblower Provisions
The IRS Whistleblower Office has established the practice of:
[P]ay[ing] money to people who blow the whistle on persons who fail
to pay the tax that they owe. If the IRS uses information provided by
the whistleblower, it can award the whistleblower up to 30 percent of
the additional tax, penalty and other amounts it collects.
The IRS may pay awards to people who provide specific and
credible information to the IRS if the information results in the
collection of taxes, penalties, interest or other amounts from the
noncompliant taxpayer. 142
It has been noted that:
The law provides for two types of awards. If the taxes, penalties,
interest and other amounts in dispute exceed $2 million, and a few
other qualifications are met, the IRS will pay 15 percent to 30 percent
of the amount collected. If the case deals with an individual, his or her
annual gross income must be more than $200,000. If the whistleblower
disagrees with the outcome of the claim, he or she can appeal to the
Tax Court....
The IRS also has an award program for other whistleblowersgenerally those who do not meet the dollar thresholds of $2 million in
dispute or cases involving individual taxpayers with gross income of
less than $200,000. The awards through this program are less, with a
maximum award of 15 perecent up to $10 million. In addition, the
awards are discretionary and
the informant cannot dispute the outcome
143
of the claim in Tax Court.

142. IRS Whistleblower-IRS Informant Award-Receive Money from the IRS, FRESH START,
http://freshstarttax.com/irs-whistleblower/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
143. Whistleblower -Informant Award, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Whistleblower-InformantAward (last updated Jan. 9, 2013).
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3. History
"What is now 26 USC § 7623(a) has been on the books since March
1867 ... ,"44 Section 7623(a) allows the Secretary of the Treasury "to
pay such sums as he deems necessary for.., detecting and bringing to
trial and punishment persons
guilty of violating the internal revenue laws
' 45
or conniving at the same."'
The IRS has stated that:
Prior to 2006 the only substantive change since 1867 was in 1996,
when a clause was added allowing payments to be made "for detecting
underpayments of tax" as another basis for an informant award,
and making the payments from proceeds collected rather than
appropriated funds.
In December of 2006, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
made fundamental changes to the IRS informant awards program[,
including] the addition of a new section 467623(b), under which [the
larger] awards are no longer discretionary. 1
4. Tax Consequences
The IRC codified that:
The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is
authorized to pay such sums as he deems necessary for ... detecting
underpayments of tax, or... detecting and bringing to trial and
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or
conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise
provided for by law. Any amount payable under the preceding sentence
shall be paid from the proceeds of amounts collected by reason of the
information provided,
and any amount so collected shall be available
47
for such payments. 1

144.

History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program,IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/History-of-

the-Whilstleblower-Informant-Program (last updated Aug. 3, 2012) [hereinafter History of the
Whistleblower].
145. I.R.C. § 7623(a)(2) (2006).
146. History of the Whistleblower, supra note 144. "The new law says that the whistleblower
shall receive 15 to 30 percent of the collected proceeds[,] ... added whistleblower appeal
fights[,] ... [and required the creation of] a Whistleblower Office reporting to the Commissioner to
implement the law." Id.
147. I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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148
The Service treats such awards as ordinary income from services.
The statute, however, refers to information provided, saying that:

The new program (found at 26 U.S.C. § 7623) focuses on large
claims. To qualify for the expanded rewards, $2 million of taxes,
penalties and interest must be involved. In a redundant provision,
individual tax cheats must have $200,000 of taxable income in any
year (obviously, to have $2 million owing, one would need to also
have at least $200,000 of taxable income). Because of these large
amounts, the primary targets under the new program are businesses
whose employees and former employees are willing to report
malfeasance. 149
What is the nature of the malfeasance reporting? Is the IRS paying
for services?
Yes and no. In a sense, the IRS wants individuals to be willing to
root out and detect fraud when it cannot. It wants individuals to offer to
turn over information to the IRS. Both of these activities sound like
services performed.
However, what the IRS really wants is information. It will not pay a
reward unless it can collect the tax, and it cannot collect the tax without
the proof, the evidence, or the information that will lead its auditors to
find and prove the fraud.150 In short, if the IRS cannot collect, neither
can the whistleblower.
Therefore, the whistleblower awards are really awards for the
transfer of information. Is information property? Yes. Why? Because the
IRS is willing to pay for it. (That is the cynical answer). The analytical
answer is because information likely to lead to an award is also likely to
constitute knowhow and documents.
As a result, the thumb drive is very likely to be the property
worth the IRS's award, and as such, constitutes property, which is a
capital asset.151
148. This was the answer the author got when he asked the question at a recent ABA Tax
Section meeting. The IRS provides the whistleblower with a Form 1099. What Happens to a Claim
for an Informant Award (Whistleblower), IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/What-Happens-to-a-Claimfor-an-Informant-Award-(Whistleblower) (last updated Aug. 3, 2012). One firm cited Rev. Rul. 70576, however, this Revenue Ruling deals with a Canadian citizen and the U.S.-Canada Tax treaty.
Rev. Rul. 70-576, 1970-2 C.B. 331. Article XIII of that treaty would exempt from U.S. tax the sale
or exchange by a Canadian citizen of capital gain property in the United States, which would
include, for example, intangible information transferred to the IRS. Double Taxation: Taxes on
Income and Capital, U.S.-Can., art. XIII, Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087.
149. IRS Raises Stakes on Tax Whistleblower Claims, FULCRUM INQUIRY (Feb. 2007),
http://www.fulcrum.com/IRSInformant.htm [hereinafter IRS Raises Stakes].
150. See id.
151. Is there such a thing as services to transfer or deliver property? Sure-truck drivers or
UPS delivery persons. Is that what the IRS is paying for? No, because the payment is dependent
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whistleblowing by showing that:

its position
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on taxation

and

For the Treasury's audit sample, it took over 7 years on average
for the informant's [sic] to be paid. This lengthy time occurred because
the IRS makes no reward payments until the IRS collects all amounts
owing and the matter is closed. However, an informant can speed this
amount by accepting an initial early payment on amounts collected
by
52
agreeing to waive further award on subsequent collections. 1
5. Transfer of Stolen Property
An additional argument to be made is that perhaps the
whistleblower is guilty of theft and therefore the "property" is not his. If
the property is not his, then he cannot transfer it to another, and if there
is no transfer, then the payment must be ordinary income (because it was
153
not in exchange for anything).
The analysis might then turn to the cases construing § 1341, notably
McKinney v. UnitedStates.' 54 Section 1341 allows a deduction when the
taxpayer discovers that income she previously included (because she
thought it was hers) turns out to belong to another. The McKinney court
held that the benefits of § 1341 are not available when the "item" in
question is embezzled funds.' It stated simply and straightforwardly
that § 1341 could not be read to cover embezzled funds because "it could
not appear to the taxpayer that 1he
had any right to the funds, much less
'an unrestricted right' to them."' 56
The court in Perez v. United States 57 was trying to decide whether
a taxpayer/embezzler could use § 1341 to apply deductions due to
restitution payments to a prior year (instead of applying the deduction to
the year in which the payment was made). 158 The court was looking at
whether the taxpayer had a right to the funds because the statutory
language asks if the taxpayer had an "unrestricted right."' 5 9

upon tax being collected. Good evidence equals good payment.
152. IRS Raises Stakes, supra note 149. Seven years to pay after the transfer of information has
occurred? If informant is paid, the IRS has accepted the information. Is that long-term gain?
153. Can I transfer property that I do not own? Possession is enough to create gain. Armory v.
Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.) 664; 1 Str. 505, 505.
154. 574 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
155. Id. at 1243.
156. Id. (emphasis omitted).
157. 553 F. Supp. 558 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
158. Id. at 559.
159. Id.
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However, other courts, such as the one that decided Wise v.
Montgomery, 160 have conducted similar inquiries: "[t]hus, some courts
have held that, because a thief has no right to the property he has stolen,
the IRS cannot impose a tax lien on stolen property because of the thief s
delinquent taxes.''
62
In Wise, the inquiry was whether the IRS could impose a tax lien. 1
That question, according to the court, could depend on whether the
taxpayer had a right to the stolen property. 63 The court raised the issue
but then dodged it because the funds over which the IRS imposed a lien
could not be traced to the stolen property. 164
The question of whether a thief who sold stolen property could
claim capital gains could depend on the same analysis. Section 61(a)(3)
imposes a tax on "dealings in property,"' 165 § 1001 addresses "[t]he gain
from the sale or other disposition of property,"' 166 § 1221 defines a
capital asset as "property held by the taxpayer,"' 167 and § 1222 defines
a
' 68
asset.'
capital
a
of
exchange
or
sale
the
from
"gain
as
capital gain
D. Gambling
1. Hypothetical
G wins $1000 at a casino, which is converted to ten $100 table
chips. Instead of cashing the chips in, G, knowing the casino to be in
rough financial shape, decides to hold on to them.169 A year later, after
the casino has been imploded on TV, a collector approaches G and offers
him $1200 for the ten chips.
2. Zarin and Other Cases
In Zarin v. Commissionerof InternalRevenue (Zarin1),17 the Third
Circuit held that:
[G]ambling chips were not property, but rather, "a medium of
exchange within the Resorts casino" and a "substitute for cash."
Alternatively, the Tax Court viewed the chips as nothing more than
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

No. CIV H-02-1242, 2003 WL 21805922 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
Id.at *2 (citing Atlas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1000 (D.N.D. 1978)).
Id.at*1.
See id.
at *2.
Id.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006).
Id. at § 1001(a).
Id.at § 1221(a).
Id.at § 1222(1).
You gotta know when to hold 'em.
916 F.2d I10(3dCir. 1990).
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"the opportunity to gamble and incidental services..." We agree with
the gist of these characterizations, and hold that 1 ambling chips are
merely an accounting mechanism to evidence debt.
The Court elaborated:
Gaming chips in New Jersey during 1980 were regarded "solely as
evidence of a debt owed to their custodian by the casino licensee and
shall be considered at no time the property of anyone other than the
casino licensee issuing them." Thus, under N.J. state law, gambling
chips were Resorts' property until transferred to Zarin in exchange for
the markers, at which point the chips became "evidence" of
indebtedness (and not the property of Zarin).
Even were there no relevant legislative pronouncement on which to
rely, simple common sense would lead to the conclusion that chips
were not property in Zarin's hands. Zarin could not do with the chips
as he pleased, nor did the chips have any independent economic value
beyond the casino. The chips themselves were of little use to Zarin,
other than as a means of facilitating gambling. They could not have
been used outside the casino. They could have been used to purchase
services and privileges within the casino, including food, drink,
entertainment, and lodging, but Zarin would not have utilized them as
such, since he received those services from Resorts on a
complimentary
basis. In short, the chips had no economic
72
substance."1
Before the Tax Court, the parties had stipulated that N.J. casino
"chips are property which are not negotiable and may not be used to
gamble or for any other purpose outside the casino where they
were issued." 173 Addressing this stipulation, the Third Circuit
acknowledged that:
It could be argued that we are bound by this stipulation to accept the
proposition that chips are property. We do not dispute the notion that
chips are property, but.., they are only property in the hands of the
casino. The stipulation is consistent with this idea. In fact, both parties
agreed in their briefs that chips are property of the casino. Moreover,
during oral arguments, both parties agreed that chips were not property
when held by the gambler.

171. Zarin 1, 916 F.2d atl 13-14 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 114 (citation omitted) (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:46-1.5(d) (1990)).
173.

Zarin v. Comm'r (Zarin I), 92 T.C. 1084, 1097 (1989).

174. Zarin I,916 F.2d at 114 n.9.
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A quick search on eBay for the term "casino chips" reveals over
36,000 auctions.175 Obviously, the auction market considers casino chips
as property.
Nevada law considers casino chips to be property. 176 N.J. law
considers casino chips to be property. 177 In fact, the section of the N.J.
Administrative Code cited by Zarin I has been changed to read:
Each gaming chip and plaque is solely evidence of a debt that the
issuing casino licensee owes to the person legally in possession of the
gaming chip or plaque, and shall remain the property of the issuing
casino licensee. Each casino licensee shall have the right at any time to
demand that the person in possession of the gaming chip or plaque
178
surrender the item for redemption ....
"Solely evidence of a debt" is an interesting term. Arguably, New
Jersey was trying either to prevent chips from becoming a second
currency or to prevent patrons taking chips from one casino to another.
However, marking the chips as evidence of debt hardly makes them less
property. For example, bonds are evidence of debt, and they enjoy a
rather robust market.
As for the argument that, at the time Zarin I was decided, N.J. law
provided that the chips were only the property of the casino and no one
else, several questions arise.
First, if I possess property of another, and sell it, does the gain
therefrom become gain from property? In other words, possession of
another's property does not change the fact that the item is still property.
Second, can a state legislate that a tangible item is not property?
Arguably, it could prevent the trappings and rights attributable to
property in its own laws from attaching to that item, but what would
happen when that item moved across its borders?
Third, for federal tax issues, do we care what a state has to say
about an item being property or not? No. Federal tax law looks to what
rights a taxpayer may have, and then assigns tax consequences based
upon federal law. The Supreme Court explained that "[they] look
initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the
property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine
175. EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/ (search for "casino chips" in "Browse by Category") (last
visited Mar. 29, 2013).
176. Section 120A.135 of Nevada's Revised Statutes Annotated excludes found casino chips
from "Unclaimed Property," and instead treats them under the "finders keepers" rule. NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 120A.135 (West 2008); Las Vegas FAQs, LAS VEGAS ADVISOR,
http://www.lasvegasadvisor.com/faq.cfin (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
177. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:46-1.5(f) (2012).
178. Id.
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whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or
'rights to property' within the compass of the federal tax lien
legislation.

' 179

3. Tax Consequences
Accordingly, G, upon winning the chips, should take a $1000 basis
in them and will be taxed on the $1000 he won. If he were to later sell
the chips for $1200, the chips would be characterized (in his hands)
as capital assets, and the resulting gain ($200) would be a long-term
capital gain.
E. What's the Point?
Eisner v. Macomber is° defined income as arising from labor, or
from capital, or from both.' 81 What happens when you cannot tell the
difference between labor and capital? Between services and property?
In our pro-intangible property market, more and more things are
being classified as "property": tenure, l8 2 advanced degrees, 8 3 body parts

and cells, 8 4 methods of doing business, 8 5 and whatever other weird
examples I can come up with. Is the proper tax treatment to give them
preferential low rates?

179. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (quoting Drye v. United States, 528 U.S.
49, 58 (1999)).
180. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
181. ld.at207.
182. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997) ("[W]e have previously held that public
employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest
in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process ....
").
183. Hinsberg v. Hinsberg, No. 290481, 2010 WL 3296081, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 19,
2010). In Hinsberg, the Court of Appeals agreed with defendant's argument that:
the trial court erred by failing to identify defendant's medical degree as a marital asset,
for which she was entitled to a "substantial" compensatory award ....[The Court held
that] one spouse's attainment of an advanced academic degree during marriage can
create a marital asset in which the other spouse holds an equitable claim.
Id.
184. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 645 F.3d 739, 747 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[A]
dead man's body 'may be considered as a sort of quasi property, in which certain persons have
rights therein, and have duties to perform."') (quoting Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042
(Tex. Ct. App. 1934)); William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to
Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOESTRA L. REv. 693, 712-13 (1995); see
generally E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996); RUSSELL ScoTr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981).

185. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010).
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III.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CAPITAL GAINS

A.

History

1. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co.
In 1921, the Supreme Court decided Merchants'Loan& Trust Co.
v. Smietanka' 86-one of the earliest cases dealing with the taxation of
capital gains. Arthur Ryerson died in 1912, and his will directed income
"to be paid to his widow during her life and after her death to be used for
the benefit of his children, or their representatives, until each child
should arrive at twenty-five years
of age, when each should receive his
'87
fund."'
trust
the
of
share
her
or
The will provided "accretions of selling values shall be considered
principal and not income," 188 which meant they would be saved for the
children and not allocated to his widow. 189 In 1917, the trust sold stock it
owned for $1,280,996.64.'90 The trust's basis in the stock was
$561,798.19' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue treated the
difference as income in the year of the sale. 192
The trustee argued that the terms of the will rendered the gain
93
untaxable.'
Plaintiff argued that:
[I]t was not income to the widow, for she did not receive it in 1917,
and never can receive it, that it was not income in that year to the
children for they did not then, and may never, receive it, and that it was
not income to the trustee, not only because the will creating the trust
required that "stock dividends and accretions of selling values shall be
considered principal and not income," but also because in the
"common understanding" the term "income" does not comprehend
such a gain or profit as we have here, which it is contended is really an
accretion to capital and
therefore not constitutionally taxable under
1 94
Eisner v. Macomber."

The Court dismissed95 the argument and allowed the tax to be
imposed upon the trustee. 1
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

255 U.S. 509 (1921).
Id.at514.
Id. at 514-15.
See id.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Seeid. at 516-17.
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2. Congressional Response
Calvin H. Johnson has observed that "Smietanka was decided in
March, 1921 and within months, Congress mostly rejected it. In the
Revenue Act of 1921, Congress gave capital gain the benefit of a
maximum 12 % tax, when ordinary income bore tax rates as high
as 54%.9196

B. Rationale
Many authors have wrestled with the task of providing a concise
rationale for a separate system for taxing capital gains.
According to Marjorie E. Komhauser, "[o]pinions were divided as
to whether [capital] gains were constitutionally taxable under an income
tax. The New York Times, which devoted many articles and editorials to
the issue, was adamantly against the income taxation of capital gains."'1 97
One editorial in the New York Times contended that:
The economic distinction between capital and income is one of natural
law, independent of either statutes or Constitutions. The Constitution
controls the procedure of Congress, but the Constitution and Congress
together would find difficulty in defeating natural law. A tax on capital
gains is a direct tax, and if the Sixteenth Amendment means anything
at all it confirms the principle that direct taxes must be apportioned to
198
population ....
Assuming there is a difference between capital gains and other
types of income, the process of discerning between the two is difficult.
What type of income is "capital?" Section 1222 attempts to answer
this question: "[t]he term 'long-term capital gain' means gain from the
,199 The
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year ....
IRC states that:
[T]he term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not
include(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand
at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer

196. Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477, 487
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
197. Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Originsof Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got To Do
With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 877 (1985).
198. Editorial, Taxation of CapitalGains, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1921, at 8.
199. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006).
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primarily for 200sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business[.]

Thus, "capital" gains are those gains arising from property
transactions, but only certain types. Peter Miller, explaining the taxation
of capital gains, said:
The rather curious statutory prerequisites to capital gains treatment
are attributable chiefly to Congress's attempt to tax gains realized upon
the sale of "investments" more leniently than income from other
sources. The statute seeks to distinguish "investment" from the other
types of profit-making activity-and especially from "speculation" and
"business" which also involve sales of property-primarily by means
of two requirements. To differentiate between "investment" and
"speculation," the statute provides that favorable treatment is to be
accorded to profit realized upon the sale of only such assets as were
owned by the taxpayer for more than [one year]. To separate
"investment" from "business," the statute provides that special
treatment is not to be given to profit realized upon the sale of various
kinds of business assets, particularly "property held by the taxpayer
course of his trade or
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
2 1

business" (the "trade or business clause").

0

The statute has been expanded to cover other types of "business
assets" (for example, depreciable assets and copyrights), 0 2 and it is
somewhat of a historical mistake that the definition was written in the
negative. 20 3 Future versions of the statute retained the format so that
capital asset treatment was the norm.20 4 But what do these two
requirements (the lengthy holding period and the trade or business
clause) mean for intangible assets?

200. Id.at § 1221(a)(1).
201. Peter Miller, The "CapitalAsset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation: 1, 59
YALE L.J. 837, 838-39 (1950) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Miller, The "Capital Asset"
Concept 1].
202. See I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(3), 1221(a)(8).
203. The first "capital gains" definition was found in § 206(a)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1921
and read:
The term "capital assets" as used in this section means property acquired and held by
the taxpayer for profit or investment for more than two years (whether or not connected
with his trade or business), but does not include property held for the personal use or
consumption of the taxpayer or his family, or stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if
on hand at the close of the taxable year.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 233 (1921).
204. See I.R.C. § 1221 ("[T]he term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-....") (emphasis
added).
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1. Investment vs. Speculation
Most of the cases discussed in this Article (lawsuits, whistleblower
awards, copyrights, and patents) are not the type of assets that would
normally fall into the category of "speculation." For one reason, these
types of assets take a good deal of time to create and then are not the
type that are normally subject to a quick transfer.
However, in recent years, the speculation rationale has morphed
into a query as to whether the taxpayer was engaged in personal services
activities in order to bring the asset into being or to arrange for its sale.
That is one justification heard frequently when dealing with copyrights,
even though the actual reason for its separation out from capital asset
treatment is due to a failure on Congress's part.2 °5
Since all assets derive some of their reason for being from some
form of personal services (land is valuable because of its location to
human activity; stock is valuable because of the efforts of the promoters,
officers, or board members; lawsuits are valuable because of the human
interactions that gave rise to them), this cannot be seen as the primary
test for capital asset status. Nor does it make sense when capital assets
share so much in common with assets denied that status.
2. Speculation vs. Business
Assuming that an asset does not fall into one of the other categories
set forth in § 1221,206 the test then becomes whether the intangible asset
has been held for sale to customers. Miller stated that:
It has often been difficult to distinguish between a sale made by a
professional speculator and that made by a businessman out of his
stock-in-trade for the reason that they share an important common
factor; in both cases the property sold has, before its disposition, been
held primarily for the purpose of resale as part of a more or less
systematic course of buying and selling. This factual similarity is so
much more conspicuous than the legal distinction (i.e., that a
businessman is one who sells "to customers" whereas a speculator does
not) that it is not surprising 20to7 find much hair-splitting as to the
meaning of these magic words.
Does the transfer of a thumb-drive to a government agent
constitute being held for sale to customers? Who is the customer of
a whistleblower?

205. See supra Part H.B.
206. See I.R.C. § 122 1(a).
207. Miller, The "CapitalAsset" Concept I, supra note 201, at 848 (footnotes omitted).
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3. Business vs. Investment
Prior to the enactment of § 1253,2o8 the question of whether the sale
of a patent was one involving sale to customers was relevant. Consider
Miller's discussion:
Most of the judicial opinions which address themselves to this
question purport to answer it by comparing the facts of the case at bar
with those found in the case of Harold T. Avery. Avery, the chief
engineer of a manufacturing corporation, was required by contract to
assign to his employer any inventions he might make while directing
its experimental work, except for about a dozen inventions conceived
before his employment commenced. In 1935 Avery sold to the
corporation one of the dozen inventions. Before this sale, he had sold
two patents and licensed two others out of the dozen. The Board of Tax
Appeals held that the proceeds of sale in 1935 were not capital gain.
The Board of Tax Appeals found that:
[P]etitioner was engaged outside of his regular hours of employment in
the business of inventing and selling and licensing of patents obtained
by him, and that the inventions and patents which he was not
contractually obligated to transfer to his employer constituted property
held by him primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
20 9
trade or business.
Consider Miller's further discussion:
The Avery case is to be contrasted with the case of John W. Hogg, a
clerk employed in a non-inventive capacity in an engineering
department. Mr. Hogg invented several devices by working about four
hours each week at night in his basement. Over twenty years he took
out four patents. In 1937 he licensed one of them to an airplane
manufacturer. In 1940 he sold this patent to the licensee. The Tax
Court decided that Mr. Hogg had realized only capital gain because an
isolated sale did not constitute a "course of business."
In common parlance, Mr. Hogg could hardly be said to have been
"in business," since that term connotes repeated transactions, and the
entire extent of his dealings was to license a single patent and then sell
it. Yet is this result really as self-evident as it appears at first blush?
After all, if Mr. Hogg was not in business, what was he doing when he
was tinkering down in the basement in his spare time? If his activity
were only a hobby, it is fair to ask, as did the Board in the Avery case,
why did he trouble himself to patent his inventions? Suppose that Mr.
Hogg subsequently found purchasers for his three other patents;

208. I.R.C. § 1253. The Effective Date of§ 1253 was January 1, 1970. Id.
209. Avery v. Comm'r, 47 B.T.A. 538, 541 (1942).
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presumably the repetition of the sale would cause a finding that he had
gone into "business" and therefore that his profits were no longer
taxable merely as capital gain. Yet is it not strange that one of the sales,
identical with the others except that it happened first, should receive a
different tax treatment? This anomaly springs from the conception of
"business" as a series of recurrent dealings. But why should "business"
be defined in this way? There is no reason to suppose that Hogg's first
sale gave rise to a lesser ability to pay than did Avery's third. Whatever
may be the validity of discriminating in favor of gain arising upon a
change in the form of investments, the invention sold by Hogg hardly
presents a very close analogy to the corporate stock or real estate sold
by the typical investor.
Assuming that Mr. Hogg and Mr. Avery are so similarly
circumstanced that they should be taxed similarly, the question arises
whether parity of treatment could be established under any reasonable
interpretation of the present statute. 210
IV.

CONCLUSION

With world economies becoming more and more knowledge-based,

the number of intangible assets will only grow. That is exciting in many
instances, but it does produce difficulties with characterizing the gain
when intangible assets are transferred. In fact, we might view the

treatment of intangible assets as something of a bellwether in terms of
whether capital gains treatment can survive the rationality test.
When we view the disparity with which intangible assets are treated
under the tax code, we come to one of two conclusions. First, we may
say that intangible asset treatment marks the death of capital gains. After
all, if our legal system is content to allow assets to be converted into
other types of capital assets, then this would allow capital gain
treatment in cases that Congress had never intended to be taxed at
preferential rates.
On the other hand, perhaps throwing out the baby with the
bathwater, capital gains is just the treatment we want. If we are content
to allow asset treatment (which would give preference for the law of
property over other types of law), then we should also be content to
allow the tax treatment to follow the form. Trusts are a good example of
this. When a beneficiary is named in a trust (a contract between a grantor
and her trustee), we may ask: What are the beneficiary's rights? May the
beneficiary transfer those rights? If so, then the beneficiary's rights
begin to look like property, and we might ask if the beneficiary's transfer
gives rise to capital gains.
210. Miller, The "CapitalAsset" Concept I, supra note 201, at 852-53.
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On the other hand, we might look through the transaction and ask if
the beneficiary has received a stream of income or owns the source of
the stream outright. Classifying every possible permutation of
2 1 and
ownership, possession, or right as property muddies the water
leaves us-well-thirsty for a solution.
A.

The Death of CapitalGains?

One way to fix the discrepancy between treating the transfer of
some assets as capital while subjecting others to ordinary income rates is
to do away with capital gains preferences altogether. After all, if all
assets, contracts, and exchanges can be recouched in terms of what the
law would allow as capital, is there any real difference between capital
gains transactions and ordinary sales?
One example highlighted earlier should suffice to make the point. If
A has a cause of action against B (and would be taxed on ordinary
income if she collected) but then "sells" that right to C, A should have
capital gains on the exchange.
If that is not the desired result, the law provides no easy
justification for the opposite case. We have a myriad cases trying to
decide when a chose in action (whether in tort, bankruptcy, or contract,
whether transferred as part of the sale of a business or alone, and when
effected) is a capital asset. As a result, we have borrowed judicial
doctrines and analyses over and over until the law is murky and vague,
and to the point where the cases no longer even look to relevant
tax statutes.
Had the legal cognoscenti been aware, they could have tried to fix
this "problem" by statute or regulation. The explosion of intellectual and
intangible property protection, however, left the financial and tax laws
behind. And maybe that lack of concern for tax law is a good
justification for a limited rule: Transfers of intangible property are to be
treated as ordinary income. After all, if tax consequences were no
concern when we created and protected the assets, then it can hardly be
said to be a factor in their sale or transfer.
B. Capital Gains Is the Appropriate Tax Avenue
On the other hand, good tax policy rarely takes such a petty view
when it has to "clean up" after the party.2 12 This party promises to go on
211. If not the metaphor as well!
212. See, e.g., Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-42, 121 Stat.
1803 (2007).
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for a while, so perhaps a long-term view is the right way to look
at things.
If our legal system is content with an expansive view of property
and quasi-property, including sweeping in contracts, ideas, and
processes, then our tax system ought to follow suit. In that case, the
operative question should really turn on whether the property in question
is of a type that we want to tax at preferential rates. This, in turn, would
require us to revisit § 1221 and its categories of ordinary income
exclusions, because leaving the structure as is only encourages taxpayers
to formulate transactions so as to turn everything into capital gains.
As Alice once said, "[i]f I had a world of my own, everything
would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is because everything
would be what it isn't. And contrary-wise, what is it wouldn't be, and
' 213
what it wouldn't be, it would. You see?

213.

ALICE INWONDERLAND, supra note 92.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss2/5

40

